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Taxing consumption to mitigate carbon leakage 
Abstract: 
Unilateral actions to reduce CO2 emissions could lead to carbon leakage such as relocation of emission-
intensive and trade-exposed industries (EITE). To mitigate such leakage, countries often supplement an 
emissions trading system (ETS) with free allocation of allowances to exposed industries, e.g. in the form of 
output-based allocation (OBA). This paper examines the welfare effects of supplementing OBA with a 
consumption tax on EITE goods. In particular, we investigate the case when only a subset of countries 
involved in a joint ETS introduces such a tax. The analytical results suggest that the consumption tax would 
have unambiguously global welfare improving effects, and have welfare improving effects for the tax 
introducing country as well unless there are strong unfavorable terms-of-trade effects. Numerical simulations 
in the context of the EU ETS support the analytical findings, including that the consumption tax is welfare 
improving for the single country that implements the tax. 
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In the Paris climate agreement from 2015, almost all countries in the world committed to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). The countries’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) vary substantially, 
however, both when it comes to ambitions and indicated measures. Moreover, the NDCs are not legally 
binding, and it remains to be seen to what degree they will be followed up. Further, the second biggest 
emitter, the United States, has already signaled withdrawal from the Paris agreement. Thus, it is fair to 
conclude that the world will still rely on unilateral initiatives to reduce GHG emissions. Unilateral action 
however leads to carbon leakage, such as relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries 
(EITE). The affected industries claim that unilateral emission constraints would raise their production costs, 
and hence reduces their competitiveness in the world market. This induces more production and emissions in 
unregulated regions. As a result, the policymaker achieves lower emission level locally, but she risks losing job 
and industry to other regions, as well as higher GHG emissions abroad.1  
Although the economic literature suggests that overall carbon leakage is moderate (typically in the range of 5-
30%, cf. Zhang, 2012, and Böhringer et al., 2012a – somewhat higher for the EITE industry),2 it is an 
important issue in the public debate and in policy decisions. Hence, policymakers have typically either 
exempted EITE industries from their climate regulation or implemented anti-leakage measures. For instance, 
sectors that are regulated by the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) and “exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage”,3 are given a large number of free allowances. The allocation is based on product-specific 
benchmarks to maintain incentives to reduce emissions per unit of output. In order to reduce leakage 
exposure and limit surplus allowance, the allocation is linked to requirements such as activity level and 
production volumes (Neuhoff et al. 2016b). Free allowance allocation conditional on output is often referred 
to as output-based allocation (OBA) (Böhringer and Lange, 2005). A big share of industry sectors in the EU 
ETS are qualified as significantly exposed to leakage. Similar allocation rules can be found in other carbon 
markets such as in New Zealand, California and the Chinese regional pilot schemes (World Bank, 2014; 
Xiong et al., 2017).  
While a large amount of free allowances could mitigate carbon leakage, this implicit output subsidy ends up 
stimulating domestic production and thereby resulting in too much use of these products globally. The 
incentives to substitute from carbon-intensive to carbon-free products are weakened. As there is uncertainty 
about leakage exposure for individual sectors, policymakers may be persuaded to allocate too many permits to 
too many industries. Sato et al. (2015) finds for instance in the EU ETS that “vulnerable sectors account for 
small shares of emission”, and Martin et al. (2014) concludes for the same market that the current allocation 
substantially overcompensates for a given carbon leakage risk. Another possible second-best policy 
instrument for anti-leakage is Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs), with put charges on embedded carbon 
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imports and refunds on export of EITE goods. Studies have shown that carbon leakage mitigation with 
BCAs would outperform OBA (Monjon and Quirion, 2011; Böhringer et al. 2012; Fischer & Fox 2012). 
BCAs may however not be politically feasible, and experts do not agree on whether or not it is compatible 
with WTO rules (Ismer and Haussner, 2016; Horn and Mavroidis, 2011; Tamiotti, 2011).  
Recently a third approach, combining OBA with a consumption tax, has been proposed. Particularly, 
Böhringer et al. (2017c) shows that it is welfare improving for a country, which has already implemented a 
carbon tax along with output-based rebating (OBR) to EITE goods, to impose a consumption tax on top of 
the same EITE goods. They also show that a certain combination of OBR and a consumption tax would be 
equivalent to BCA. Further, whereas BCA may be politically contentious to introduce under current WTO 
rules, a consumption tax does not face the same challenge as it treats domestic and foreign goods 
symmetrically (Neuhoff et al., 2016a).4 There are other papers as well that examine a consumption tax related 
to environmental regulations, both alone or combined with other instruments (Roth et al. 2016; Eichner & 
Pethig 2015; Holland 2012). Moreover, policymakers in for example California, China, Japan, and Korea are 
currently operating with a price on carbon that also regulates the embodied carbon from consumption of 
carbon-intensive products, especially electricity (Munnings et al. 2018;). The extra administrative costs of a 
consumption tax are probably limited once an OBA scheme is already in place, cf. e.g. Neuhoff (2016b).5 
Our paper builds on the basic model and findings in Böhringer et al. (2017c). However, whereas the latter 
paper considers one regulating and one unregulating region, this paper examines the case where there is one 
unregulating region but two regulating regions that have a joint emission trading system with OBA to the 
EITE-goods. Further, only one of the two regions is considering to impose a consumption tax. The 
motivation for this is the current situation in Europe, where the EU/EEA countries have set quite ambitious 
climate targets for 2030 and especially 2050, and where EU institutions have responded enthusiastically to the 
Paris Climate Agreement outcome (Andresen et al., 2016). At the same time, there is significant political 
tension and different interests among the member states in the EU when it comes to climate policies. A 
prime example is the group of European countries depended on domestically produced coal, that have been 
critical towards EU’s long-term climate goals. Other countries, especially in the north and west of Europe, are 
in favor of increasing the ambitions in line with the Paris agreement’s requirement of gradually more 
ambitious targets. In the absence of cooperation to strengthen the climate policies, such as tightening the 
ETS further, the question is if unilateral action by a single country (or a group of countries) in the EU/EEA 
such as implementing a consumption tax on EITE goods would be welfare-improving or not.  
We show analytically that under certain conditions it is welfare improving for a single region to introduce a 
consumption tax when the OBA is already implemented jointly in the two abating regions, unless there are 
strong unfavorable terms-of-trade effects. We also find that the consumption tax has an unambiguously 
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global welfare improving effect. Based on the analytical findings, we complement with results from a stylized 
numerical simulation model calibrated to data for the world economy, with three regions and three goods. As 
already indicated, we are particularly interested in the European context and the EU ETS, where a variant of 
output-based allocation is already in place for emission-intensive goods. The numerical results support our 
analytical findings, irrespective of which EU/EEA country we consider as the single region imposing a 
consumption tax. That is, the policy is welfare improving, both for the single country and globally. 
As mentioned, the analytical model in our paper builds on the model framework in Böhringer et al. (2017c). 
However, there are several differences between the two papers. First, we examine the case with three instead 
of two regions. Second, we consider a broader range of policies. While Böhringer et al. consider a carbon tax 
in their analytical part, and a fixed global emission reduction in the numerical part, we consider the case where 
two of the three countries are involved in a joint emission trading system and one the two considers imposing 
a consumption tax. Further, our paper focuses on specific regions, including two regulating regions in 
Europe, whereas Böhringer et al. divide the world into two equally sized economies. A common assumption 
in the two papers is that producers can reduce emissions independently of output reductions. This is an 
important assumption, as the purpose of the policymaker typically is to reduce emissions in EITE industries 
without reducing the production of the same good. The latter assumption differs from other papers such as 
Eichner and Pethig (2015). They show that combining production and consumption-based taxes outperform 
only production-based taxation, but assumes a one to-one relationship between emissions and production of 
the emission-intensive good.  
In section 2 we introduce our theoretical model, and analyze the welfare effect of a consumption tax, when a 
joint emission trading system combined with OBA is already in place for a subset of regions. In section 3, we 
transfer our analysis to a stylized multi-region multi-sector numerical model. The numerical model is based on 
the theoretical model in section 2 and calibrated to data for the world economy. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
We build on the model framework in Böhringer et al. (2017c), but extend it to one more region and examine 
a broader range of policies. Consider a model with 3 regions, 𝑗𝑗 = {1,2,3}, and three goods 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, and 𝑧𝑧. Good 
𝑥𝑥 is emission-free and tradable, 𝑦𝑦 is emission-intensive and tradable (EITE) goods such as metal and other 
minerals), while 𝑧𝑧 is emission-intensive and non-tradable (e.g. electricity and transport). Same types of goods, 
produced in different regions, are assumed homogenous. Carbon leakage may take place through relocating 
production of the 𝑦𝑦 good, and thus OBA is considered for this sector. The market price for the goods 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 
and 𝑧𝑧 in region 𝑗𝑗 are denoted 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 and 𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥. 
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The utility for the representative consumer in region 𝑗𝑗 is given by 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥�?̅?𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧̅𝑥𝑥�, where the bar denotes 
consumption of the three goods. The utility function follows the normal assumptions; twice differentiable, 
increasing and strictly concave, i.e., the Hessian matrix is negative definite and we have a local maximum. 
Production of good 𝑦𝑦 in region 𝑗𝑗 is 𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦1𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦3𝑥𝑥, where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 denotes produced goods in region 𝑗𝑗 
and sold in region 𝑖𝑖 (and similarly for the x good). The cost of producing the goods in region 𝑗𝑗 is given by 
𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�, 𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥�𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥, 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥� and 𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥�𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 , 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥�, where 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 and 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 denote emission from good 𝑦𝑦 and z in the 
region 𝑗𝑗. We assume that the cost is increasing in production for all goods, and that the cost of producing 
good 𝑦𝑦 and 𝑧𝑧 is decreasing in emissions, i.e., 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦
𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥, 𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧




𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 etc.). Further, 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒
𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥, 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒
𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 ≤ 0 
with strict inequality when emission is regulated, cost is twice differentiable and strictly convex. All derivatives 
are assumed to be finite. 
Supply and demand give us the following market equilibrium conditions: 
?̅?𝑥1 + ?̅?𝑥2 + ?̅?𝑥3 = 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑥𝑥3 
𝑦𝑦�1 + 𝑦𝑦�2 + 𝑦𝑦�3 = 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2 + 𝑦𝑦3    (1) 
𝑧𝑧̅𝑥𝑥 = 𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 
 
2.1. Climate policies 
We assume that regions 1 and 2 have already implemented a cap-and-trade system, regulating emissions from 
production of the goods y and z in the two regions: 
𝐸𝐸� = 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧2 
where 𝐸𝐸� is the binding cap on total emission. The emission trading market is balanced through the emission 
price t. We further assume that the two regions have implemented output-based allocation (OBA) to 
producers of the EITE good y, in order to mitigate carbon leakage to region 3, where we assume there is no 
climate policy imposed. OBA means that producers of good y receive free allowances in proportion to their 
output, which is an implicit subsidy s to production of good y in regions 1 and 2. The subsidy is proportional 
to the (endogenous) emission price t and the number of allowances received per unit produced. In the special 
case where the total number of free allowances to producers of the y good equals the total emissions from 
this sector, we have that 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑡𝑡(𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦2)/(𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2). As the good z is not trade-exposed, there is no OBA 
to producers of this good. 
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Next, we assume that region 1 considers to implement a consumption tax 𝑣𝑣1 on consumption of the y good, 
𝑦𝑦�1. The motivation for this tax is, as explained in the introduction, to counteract the negative impacts of 
OBA, which stimulates too much use of the y good. 







𝑦𝑦 = ���𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥�
3
𝑖𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥�𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 , 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥� − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥,𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥  𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗
𝑧𝑧 = �𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 − 𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥�𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 , 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥� − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥�. 
 
Since region 3 does not undertake any environmental policy, 𝑡𝑡3 = 𝑠𝑠3 = 0, whereas we have 𝑡𝑡1 = 𝑡𝑡2 = 𝑡𝑡 and 
𝑠𝑠1 = 𝑠𝑠2 = 𝑠𝑠 (see above). The first order conditions are straightforward to derive, and give the following 
relationships (assuming interior solution): 
𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥3 = 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1 = 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3 






𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥      (2) 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒
𝑦𝑦1 = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1 = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒
𝑦𝑦2 = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧2 = −𝑡𝑡 ; 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒
𝑦𝑦3 = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧3 = 0 
 
We notice that interior solution requires that the prices of the two tradable goods x and y are equalized across 
regions, as both are homogenous with no cost of trade, i.e., we may define: 
𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 , 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 
 
The representative consumer in region 𝑗𝑗 maximizes utility given consumption prices and an exogenous 
budget restriction 𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥: 
ℒ𝑥𝑥 = 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥�?̅?𝑥𝑥𝑥 , 𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥 , 𝑧𝑧̅𝑥𝑥� −  𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥�𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥?̅?𝑥𝑥𝑥 + �𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥�𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧̅𝑥𝑥 − 𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥� 
 
Differentiating the Lagrangian function w.r.t the goods, we get the following first-order conditions: 
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𝑥𝑥 − 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 = 0, 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥
= 𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦�
𝑥𝑥 − �𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥� = 0, 𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝑧𝑥𝑥
= 𝑢𝑢?̅?𝑧
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 = 0  (3) 
where we have assumed interior solution, and normalized the utility functions so that 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 = 1. 
Further, we assume that the regions have a balance-of-payment constraint. The net export from a region is 
equal to domestic production minus domestic consumption. Given the assumption of one global price for 
each of the tradable goods, we have from (2) that 
𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥� + 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 − ?̅?𝑥𝑥𝑥� = 0    (4) 
 
 
2.2. The optimal consumption tax in region 1 under OBA 
2.2.1. Welfare maximization in region 1 
 
In order to evaluate the different climate policies, we need to specify the regional welfare functions. The 
welfare in region j can be expressed as: 
𝑊𝑊𝑥𝑥 = 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥�?̅?𝑥𝑥𝑥 ,𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥 , 𝑧𝑧̅𝑥𝑥� − 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� − 𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥�𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 , 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥� − 𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥�𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 , 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥� − 𝜏𝜏𝑥𝑥(𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦3 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧3)  (5) 
where 𝜏𝜏𝑥𝑥 is region j’s valuation of reduced global GHG emissions. We will refer to this as the Pigouvian tax.7  
The welfare consists of three elements: i) utility of consumption, ii) costs of production, and iii) costs of 
emissions. Note that the permit price t might vary from the Pigouvian tax. 
Next, we want to derive the optimal consumption tax 𝑣𝑣1of good 𝑦𝑦 in region 1, given that an emission trading 
system with OBA for sector y has already been implemented for regions 1 and 2. 
By differentiating (5) with respect to 𝑣𝑣1, subject to (4), we arrive at the following result for the optimal level 













(𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦�1) − 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1






















The first factor (a) is negative since an increase in consumption tax will lead to a decrease in consumption of 




An imposed consumption tax in region 1 leads to less total demand of 𝑦𝑦, and thus the global market price 
falls. Hence, the production of 𝑦𝑦 decreases in all the three regions and the second term (b) in the equation is 
negative. The term reflects the distortive side effects of the implicit OBA subsidy that causes too much 
consumption of this good. 
Since the consumption of 𝑦𝑦 falls, 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 decreases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝑦𝑦
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
< 0. The consumer will now buy more of the 
relatively cheaper good 𝑥𝑥, and hence 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
> 0. Whether part (c) is negative or positive will then depend on 
(𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦�1) and (𝑥𝑥1 − ?̅?𝑥1), i.e., whether region 1 is a net exporter or importer of the two goods. For instance, 
if region 1 is a net exporter of good 𝑥𝑥 and net importer of good y, the term becomes negative. This term 
therefore captures the terms-of-trade effects for the region. 
The fourth part (d) consists of two terms, where the first term inside the parenthesis is negative as explained 
above. The second term is likely positive, due to interactions in the quota market. Remember that the sum of 
emissions from sector y and z in regions 1 and 2 must be unchanged and equal to the emission cap. Thus, 
emissions from production of the good z must increase as long as emissions from producing good y in 
regions 1 and 2 decline, and this is realized due to a lower quota price when production (and hence emissions) 
of y decreases. Whether joint emissions from sector y and z in region 1 increases or decreases is thus 
ambiguous. However, if the consumption tax in region 1 affects producers of good y in region 1 stronger 
(weaker) than producers in region 2, the sign of part (d) is likely positive (negative). Finally, we notice that the 
higher (lower) the permit price, the more (less) important this part becomes compared to the next part (e).   
The last part (e) captures the emission effect in region 3. When global demand and the market price of good 𝑦𝑦 





< 0. The effects on 
consumption of the non-tradable good z, and hence production and emissions, in region 3 are ambiguous. 
However, with the emission effect from production of good y as a first order effect, while impacts in sector z 
is a second order effect, it seems very likely that the former effect is stronger than the latter effect.9 Thus, the 
sum of the two terms in part (e) is negative, i.e., emissions in region 3 decline when the consumption tax is 











� < 0     (7) 
Recall that the first term (a) is negative. Then there are two negative and two ambiguous terms inside the 
bracket. Hence, the sign of the optimal consumption tax is in general ambiguous. However, if region 1 is not 
a net exporter of the y good, and if producers in regions 1 and 2 react symmetrically to the consumption tax 
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(i.e., for the y good and the z good), then the optimal consumption tax in region 1 is unambiguously positive. 
Hence, we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. Consider a region i that has a joint emission trading system with another region j, where 
output-based allocation is implemented for production of EITE-goods. Then it is optimal for region i to also 
impose a consumption tax on EITE-goods if it is not a net exporter of EITE-goods and producers in regions 
i and j react symmetrically to the consumption tax. 
Proof: As explained in the text, the sign of factor (a) in equation (6) is strictly negative, while the signs of the 
terms inside the bracket of (6) are all negative (some strictly negative) if region i  is not a net exporter of good 
y and producers in regions i and j react symmetrically to the consumption tax. Hence, the sign of 𝑣𝑣1∗ is 
strictly positive, and thus the proposition is proved. 
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, recall that there is one intended and one unintended effect 
of imposing OBA. The intended effect is to mitigate leakage, i.e., reduce emissions in the unregulating region. 
The unintended effect is that the implicit production subsidy causes too much use of the EITE good. That is, 
OBA hampers the switch from emission-intensive goods to less emission-intensive goods. The purpose of 
the consumption tax is to mitigate the unintended effect (i.e., re-establishing the switch towards less emission-
intensive goods) without compromising with the intended effect of OBA.  The proposition above shows that 
the consumption tax is welfare-improving, also for a country that is part of an emission trading system with 
OBA.  
If the consumption tax is imposed in both region 1 and region 2 (v1 = v2 = v), and we consider the joint 
welfare in these two regions (assuming a common valuation of global emission reduction equal to τ), the 
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��  (8)  
In this case, we see that part (d) in equation (6) has disappeared, and the optimal consumption tax (for regions 
1 and 2 jointly) is positive if region 3 is not a net importer of the good y. 
 
2.2.2. The global welfare maximization 
Let us now assume that the planer in region 1 is concerned about the global welfare when imposing a 
unilateral climate policy in region 1, including the cost of emissions as before. Global welfare can then be 




𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺 = ∑ �𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥�?̅?𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧̅𝑥𝑥� − 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� − 𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥�𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥, 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥� − 𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥�𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 , 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥� − 𝜏𝜏1(𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥)�𝑥𝑥=1,2,3  (9) 
where 𝜏𝜏1 is still region 1’s valuation of global emissions, referred to as the Pigouvian tax above.  
 
By differentiating w.r.t. to the consumption tax in region 1 (given a joint quota market with OBA in regions 1 
and 2), we find that:10 
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From previously, we know that (f) is negative, 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�
1
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
< 0, as a consumption tax causes less demand in region 1. 
Furthermore, the global market price for good 𝑦𝑦 falls because of less demand and the price reduction makes 







0. This is similar to part (b) in equation (6). 
The last terms is identical to the last term in (6), which we argued is negative, cf. equation (7).  
The social planner in region 1 was earlier concerned about the terms-of-trade effects when maximizing 
welfare in region 1, while this is not the case when it takes a global welfare perspective. Moreover, part (d) in 
equation (6) is also no longer present in equation (9) as the planner takes into account effects on production 
costs in region 2 as well.  
Thus, we see that from a global welfare perspective, the optimal consumption tax in region 1 is 
unambiguously positive. We state this as a proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. Consider a region i that has a joint emission trading system with another region j, where 
output-based allocation is implemented for production of EITE-goods. Then it is optimal from a global 
welfare perspective that region i impose a consumption tax on EITE-goods. 
Proof: As explained in the text, the sign of factor (f) in equation (10) is strictly negative, while the signs of the 
terms inside the bracket of (10) are both strictly negative. Hence, the sign of 𝑣𝑣1𝐺𝐺∗ is strictly positive, and thus 
the proposition is proved. 
Last, consider the case if region 3 is unaffected by the consumption tax in region 111. Equation (9) then 
becomes: 
















Since consumption of y in region 2 is likely to increase as a result of the consumption tax in region 1 (via 
lower price of the y good), the numerator is likely smaller than the denominator. Thus, we have 𝑣𝑣1𝐺𝐺∗ <  𝑠𝑠1. 
However, the less consumption in region 2 responds to the reduced consumption in region 1, the higher is 
𝑣𝑣1𝐺𝐺∗. Moreover, if we return to the case with two regions (or implement the consumption tax in both regions 
1 and 2), the optimal consumption tax becomes equal to the OBA subsidy: 𝑣𝑣1𝐺𝐺∗ =  𝑠𝑠1. The latter supports 
the findings from Böhringer et al. (2017c) when a consumption tax is implemented on top of the OBR, in a 
two regions case. 
 
3. Numerical analysis 
Based on the theoretical model, we now transfer our analysis to numerical simulations with a stylized 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model based on Böhringer et al. (2017c). Numerical simulations are 
useful to examine the ambiguous outcomes from our theoretical analysis, while also give more in-depth 
insights into the proportion of economic effects based on empirical data. We are particularly interested in the 
case of Norway, which has a joint emission trading system with the European Union (EU ETS), where a 
variant of output-based allocation is already in place for emission-intensive goods. Our main question here is 
whether it is welfare-improving for Norway to implement a consumption tax on such goods, when the effects 
on global emissions are also taken into account. 
 
3.1 Model summary 
We assume three regions calibrated according to Norway (NOR), the European Union (EU) and rest of the 
world (ROW). The three regions have four production sectors: non-carbon and tradable production x, 
carbon-intensive and tradable production y, carbon-intensive and non-tradable production z, and fossil 
energy production f. In line with the theoretical analysis, x, y and z can only be used in final consumption. 
Like in Böhringer et al. (2017c), f can only be used in production (of y and z) and cannot be traded between 
regions. Hence, we focus on the carbon leakage related to the competitive channel, in accordance with the 
theoretical analysis. As in the theoretical model, the tradable goods are assumed homogenous with a global 
price and no transportation cost.  
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The input factors in production are capital, labor, fossil energy and natural resources. Capital, labor and fossil 
energy are mobile between sectors but immobile between regions.12 The resource is only used in fossil energy 
production, and is also immobile. The input factors are combined by the producers at minimum cost subject 
to technological constraints. Production of x, y, z is expressed by two level CES cost functions, describing the 
demand responsiveness for capital, labor and fossil energy input. For f production, the two level CES cost 
function consists of capital, labor and resource. At the top level, we have the CES function with substitution 
between energy/resource and the value-added (capital and labor) composite. At the second level, the CES 
value-added composite consists of substitution between capital and labor13. Further, emission is proportional 
to the use of fossil energy as input for production. Thus, the emission reduction takes place by reducing 
energy use through either; i) substitution of energy by the value-added composite, or ii) reducing the 
production output. 
Each region’s final consumption is determined by a representative agent who maximizes utility subject to a 
budget constraint. The representative agent’s budget constraint is the monetary value of regional endowment 
of capital, labor and resource. The agent’s utility is given as a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
combination of final consumption goods. 
 
3.2 Data and calibration 
We use the standard calibration procedure in general equilibrium analysis, where base-year data information 
defines some of the exogenous parameter values. For other parameters, we either use estimates from other 
studies, calibrate them based on simulations of a well-established large-scale CGE-model (Böhringer et al., 
2017c), or use educated guesses (see below for details). 
The calibration of the model is based on World input Output Database (WIOD) data (base-year 2009)14. We 
restructure the empirical data to fit the model described in Section 3.1. The WIOD-dataset of the world is 
based on 43 regions with 56 sectors, linked with corresponding data of CO2 emission from each sector.15 We 
map all the WIOD sectors into four merged sectors x, y, z and f.16 Further, we stick to the presumption in 
the theoretical analysis that there are no carbon related emissions in sector 𝑥𝑥, and thus set emissions in this 
sector equal to zero.17 Production, consumption and CO2 emissions per sector and region are shown in Table 
1. 
We observe and quantify net exports in sector 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 in the base-year based on the difference between a 
region’s production and consumption. This balance of payment constraint is incorporated in the numerical 
simulation model. As mentioned before, we assume no trade for the 𝑧𝑧 sector. The calibrated z sector, 
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however, is a composite of some sectors with limited trade. Thus, we simply assume that produced quantity 
in a region is the same as consumed quantity in the same region. 
The representative agent is assumed to have a CES utility function, which is calibrated on share form with 
share parameters of consumption set to base-year shares. We mainly consider the effects of assuming 
heterogeneous goods in the numerical simulations. That is, we follow the heterogeneous goods approach by 
Armington (1969) and distinguish between domestic and foreign produced goods (“Armington goods”). Like 
Böhringer et al. (2017c), we use a substitution elasticity of 0.5 between the three goods at the top level in the 
utility function. At the second level, we incorporate substitution elasticity of 8 between domestic and 
imported goods x and y, and at the third level we distinguish between the origin of the foreign produced 
goods with a substitution elasticity of 16. We also present the results with the assumption of homogenous 
goods, which reflects the theoretical model, while we consider heterogeneous goods to be more realistic. With 








xNOR 422 448 - 
yNOR 179 111 2.39x10-2 
zNOR 46 46 2.26x10-2 
xEU 24 645 24 162 - 
yEU 4 846 5 000 8.76x10-1 
zEU 1 952 1 952 1.76 
xROW 60 160 60 166 - 
yROW 19 301 19 214 6.32 
zROW 5 820 5 820 11.84 
Table 1: Base-year values from WIOD data and calibrated parameters in the numerical model 
 
3.3 Policy scenarios 
We consider the calibrated equilibrium in 2009 as a business-as-usual scenario, even though the EU ETS was 
already in place with an average ETS price of 13 Euro per ton CO2 in 2009. Norway joined the EU ETS in 
2008. Our reference (REF) policy scenario is when Norway and the EU together implement a joint emission 
reduction target for the whole economy, using an economy-wide ETS with either auctioning or unconditional 
grandfathering. The reduction target is set to 20 percent in the main scenarios.18 Next, we consider the 
scenario where producers of the y good receive allowances in proportion to their output, i.e., output-based 
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allocation (OBA). We assume that the number of free allowances to y producers is chosen so that the net 
purchase of allowances for y producers is zero, i.e., 𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2) = 𝑡𝑡(𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦2).19 Then we consider 
scenarios where Norway implements a carbon consumption tax on the y good (OBA+Tax). As a comparison, 
we also consider scenarios where Norway and the EU implement such a consumption tax jointly. Whereas 
both OBA and the consumption tax are directed towards the emission-intensive and trade-exposed sector y, 
sector z will still be competing for the available permits after the additional policies are adopted. In the 
OBA+Tax scenarios we consider different levels of the consumption tax, ranging from 0% to 200% as a 
fraction of the OBA rate s.  
Neither the OBA nor the consumption tax will affect emissions within the EU + Norway (due to the fixed 
emission cap), but emissions in other countries may change via changes in the leakage rate. Since global 
emissions are different across the policy scenarios, we need to put a price on global emission reductions (as in 
Section 2). For the most part, we will assume that the permit price in the REF scenario reflects Norway’s 
valuation of global emission reductions.  
To examine the sensitivity of our findings, we present a number of sensitivity analysis in Section 3.5. 
3.4 Results 
We investigate the effects on key indicators such as leakage rate, welfare, permit price and production. The 
leakage rate is defined as percentage changes in the non-abating region’s (ROW) emission, over emissions 
reduction in the abating regions (NOR+EU). The welfare change measure is the ratio between BAU and the 
different policy scenarios, where regional welfare is defined as the money-metric utility of consumption minus 




Figure 1: Leakage rate from Norway and EU under different combination of policies, and assumptions of heterogonous (heterog) and 
homogenous (homog) goods. “NOR” denotes consumption tax only in Norway, while “NOR&EU” denotes joint consumption tax 
in the two regions. The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate consumption tax rate as a share of the OBA rate. 
Figure 1 shows the effects on leakage in the different scenarios. In the REF scenario, with only emission 
pricing, the leakage rate is close to 95% in the homogenous goods case, while merely 8% in the 
heterogeneous goods case. Since goods are less trade exposed with a lower Armington elasticity, the leakage 
rate is consequently lower as well. Given no energy trade in our model, leakage only happens through the 
market for EITE-goods (y) in our analysis. Next, the figure shows that introducing OBA has significant 
impact on leakage, which is fully eliminated. That is, OBA provides a perfect leakage mitigation tool in our 
model. With consumption tax gradually introduced in Norway, the leakage rate continues to decrease, but 
only slightly as Norway constitutes a small part of the abating regions.21 However, the consumption tax has a 
slightly bigger impact on the leakage rate when it is introduced in both regions.  
The permit price is $179 or $70 in REF, when we assume heterogonous or homogenous goods, respectively. 
As stated earlier, the OBA tends to simulate local production of the y good, while the consumption tax 
reduces the demand for the same good. This has implications for the permit market in EU and Norway, and 
hence for the permit price. The permit price increases under OBA, as expected: With more output of the y 
good produced domestically, the permit price must increase in order to clear the permit market. With 




Figure 2: Norway’s welfare effect under different combination of policies, and assumptions of heterogonous (heterog) and 
homogenous (homog) goods. “NOR” denotes consumption tax only in Norway, while “NOR&EU” denotes joint consumption tax 
in the two regions. The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate consumption tax rate as a share of the OBA rate. 
Figure 2 shows the welfare change in Norway under the different policies. The change is displayed as a 
percentage change compared to the BAU scenario, also taking into account the change in global emissions, 
where we use the emission price from REF to value these changes. We attribute the welfare change related to 
emission to the region(s) that imposes the policy. Thus, if only Norway implements a consumption tax, the 
whole emission reduction (vis-à-vis OBA) is regarded as a welfare gain for Norway. If both Norway and the 
EU introduce a joint consumption tax, only a share of the emission benefits is assigned Norway, where the 
share is determined by Norway’s initial emissions relative to that of Norway and the EU in total. As discussed 
in Section 2, the marginal cost of emissions τ could be different from the permit price t. Thus, a sensitivity 
analysis is carried out with different marginal cost of emission τ in the following section.  
The OBA reallocates production from ROW back to the abating regions. Further, global emissions decline 
under the OBA scenario compared to REF, meaning less climate damages. However, with OBA leading to 
higher permit price and lower price for good y, the demand for all other goods fall in Norway. The overall 
results indicate a welfare declining effect of OBA in Norway, which is a net exporter of EITE goods. The 
theoretical analysis in Section 2 suggested ambiguous effects on welfare for a region that implements a 
consumption tax, if the region is a net exporter of the leakage-exposed good. Our numerical simulation 
however suggests that the consumption tax is welfare improving in Norway, with an optimal consumption tax 
in the range of about 80% (40%) of the OBA-rate when assuming heterogeneous (homogenous). The welfare 
impacts are generally small, however. The main drivers for the welfare improvement in Norway seem to be 
both lower global emissions and correction of the distortive OBA effects (as the terms of trade effects are 
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negative for Norway). When disregarding the welfare effects of lower global emissions, the optimal 
consumption tax (for Norway) is still positive but somewhat lower (40% vs. 80%). If both abating regions 
introduce the consumption tax, Norway’s welfare is practically unchanged up to a tax level of 20% of the 
OBA-rate when assuming heterogeneous goods, while the optimal tax for Norway is 60% of the OBA-rate 
when assuming homogenous goods. 
 
Figure 3: Global welfare effects under different combination of policies, and assumptions of heterogonous (heterog) and homogenous 
(homog) goods. “NOR” denotes consumption tax only in Norway, while “NOR&EU” denotes joint consumption tax in the two 
regions. The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate consumption tax rate as a share of the OBA rate. 
According to our proposition 2, a consumption tax on top of the OBA in Norway, has an unambiguously 
positive effect from a global welfare perspective. Results illustrated in Figure 4 support this finding, and 
suggest an optimal consumption tax is in the range of around 120% of the OBA-rate when assuming 
heterogeneous goods. Naturally, the global welfare improvement is much stronger if both abating regions 
introduce the tax, and again the welfare effects are lower when assuming homogenous goods. 
Figure 4 shows the welfare gains for EU and ROW when assuming Armington goods. EU_ in the legends 
corresponds to EU’s welfare effect, while ROW_ corresponds to ROW’s welfare effect. Contrary to Norway, 
the OBA results in a welfare improving effect for EU22. This supports previous findings in e.g. Böhringer et 
al. (2017a), when assuming homogenous tradable goods. In the case where the consumption tax is imposed in 
both the EU and Norway, we notice that the EU benefits from this. In this case, we further see that ROW 
slightly loses.23 Hence, the global welfare improvement shown in Figure 3 is partly due to the fact that 
Norway and the EU gains from terms of trade effects at the expenses of ROW (in addition to the gains from 
lower emissions). The welfare effect in ROW is also (slightly) negative when a consumption tax is introduced 
only in Norway. This result supports similar findings in Böhringer et al. (2017c). It is however important to 
emphasize that overall global welfare effects from the consumption tax are unambiguously positive, and thus 
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in principle at least all regions could be better off if ROW were to be compensated through a monetary 
transfer.  
 
Figure 4: EU’s and ROW’s welfare effects under different combination of policies and assumption of heterogonous (heterog) goods. 
“NOR” denotes consumption tax only in Norway, while “NOR&EU” denotes joint consumption tax in the two regions. The 
numbers on the horizontal axis indicate consumption tax rate as a share of the OBA rate. 
The effects on consumption in Norway is shown in Figure 5, under different combinations of policies where 
the consumption tax is only introduced in Norway. Here we consider the heterogonous goods approach. A 
carbon price (REF) increases the costs for the producers of carbon intensive goods y and z in Europe, and 
hence the price of these goods, which further reduces the demand for y and z in Norway (and the EU). The 
consumption of the carbon-free good x, which is now relatively cheaper, increases. When OBA is introduced 
for the good y, we have the opposite effect for this good as OBA works as an implicit production subsidy to 
y. Consumption of y and x is higher than the BAU-level under OBA. When the consumption tax is 
introduced on good y, we see that the consumption of y decreases significantly, while consumption of x and z 
increases. Consumption of z is always below the BAU scenario, however, in our results. The increased 
consumption of x and z is due to the relative price changes, as well as declining permit price, and improved 
terms-of-trade effects. More of the y good is now exported from Norway and more is imported of x.  
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Figure 5: Consumption of the three goods in Norway under different combination of policies, and assumption of heterogonous 
goods. Consumption tax only imposed in Norway. The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate consumption tax rate as a share of the 
OBA rate. 
 
3.5 Sensitivity analysis 
How robust are our numerical results with respect to changes in our model assumptions? For instance, the 
theoretical analysis showed that regional welfare effects for the tax-implementing region are ambiguous, while 
the numerical simulations showed a positive effect for Norway. Furthermore, the simulations confirmed the 
unambiguous theoretical result that global welfare improves. To check the robustness of the results, we now 
examine the effects of changing some of our main assumptions: i) the EU tightens its emission cap in line 
with imposing the consumption tax, ii) the mobility of capital, iii) the optimal Pigouvian tax being higher than 
the emission price in REF, iv) different Armington and substitution elasticity, v) and a consumption tax 
introduced in other European countries than Norway. 
In the base assumption the overall emission in EU is unchanged after introducing the consumption tax, 
resulting in a reallocation of emission between EU member states. However, it could be the case that the EU 
decides to tighten its emission cap in order to avoid the so-called waterbed effect. EU’s tightening of the 
emission cap has been strengthened from 1.7% to 2.2% per year in response to low emission prices. In 
addition, the Market Stability Reserve has been implemented, probably leading to cancellation of allowances 
(Perino, 2018). Thus, implementing a consumption tax could possibly lead to similar tightening of the system. 
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One way to address this situation, where the EU does additional emission reductions in line with imposing 
the consumption tax, is to fix the price of emission (equal to price under OBA). By examining this case, 
where the consumption tax is introduced in Norway, or Norway and the EU, the results show somewhat 
higher welfare effect from the consumption tax in both regions compared to the baseline situation. The 
leakage rate is slightly higher with additional emission reduction in the EU because of unchanged emission 
price,24 while global emissions are lower. However, the differences compared to the baseline simulations are 
only marginal for both welfare and leakage. 
Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis of Norway’s welfare effects of consumption tax: Baseline simulations (Base_heterog.), immobile capital 
(Im_cap), higher Pigouvian tax (High_τ), higher substitution elasticity (High_sub), and lower Armington elasticity (Low_Arm). 
In most sectors, capital is likely immobile in the short term. Figure 6 shows the welfare effect globally and for 
Norway with the assumption of immobile capital between sectors but still domestically mobile labor force. 
With immobile capital, the leakage is less of a concern and hence the welfare changes are more beneficial 
under all scenarios compared with the benchmark assumption, both for Norway and globally. Further, the 
optimal consumption tax is around 60% of the OBA rate while the optimal consumption tax for global 
welfare is in the range of about 20% of the OBA rate. 
In our theoretical analysis, we discussed the possibility of the Pigouvian tax being different from the carbon 
price observed in the REF scenario (in the benchmark simulations, we have assumed that the two are equal). 
In particular, given the low prices in the EU Emission Trading System over the last years, one could argue 
that the Pigouvian tax is higher than the current CO2 price. In our baseline simulations, the permit price is 
rather high, as the emission reduction target is quite ambitious (20%). Figure 6 shows the case if EU’s 
reduction target is set to 10% and the Pigouvian tax is at the same level as in the baseline simulation, the 
benefits of the climate policy would naturally be bigger as global emission reductions would have a greater 
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impact on welfare. Hence for Norway, the optimal consumption tax is somewhat higher than with our 
benchmark assumption, now in the range of around 100% of the OBA rate. For the global welfare effect, the 
optimal consumption tax is around 120% of the OBA rate. The additional welfare gains from the 
consumption tax in Norway and globally are however about the same as in the benchmark simulations. 
With a lower Armington elasticity, we now assume less trade-exposure for producer 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦. In Figure 6 we 
show how this assumption affects the global and Norway’s welfare. The welfare effects under all the different 
policy scenarios are higher with a lower Armington elasticity. This is mainly a result of leakage now being 
more limited, and therefore the global benefits of emission reductions are bigger. The numerical simulations 
still suggest that the consumption tax is welfare improving for Norway. Moreover, the optimal consumption 
tax is now higher (100% of the OBA rate) than in our benchmark simulations with the Armington goods 
assumption (80% of the OBA rate). The global welfare effects are also positive, but still limited with only 
Norway introducing the consumption tax. The optimal consumption tax for the global welfare is still in the 
range of 120% of the OBA rate. The global welfare effects are in general higher with lower Armington 
elasticity, and that moving from REF to OBA has higher global welfare gains. 
In our baseline simulations, we assumed a substitution elasticity value of 0.5. With a higher value (of 2) the 
consumption tends to shift more towards the carbon-free good 𝑥𝑥 in REF, and to 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑧𝑧 with a 
consumption tax. Hence, Norway’s welfare gains of a consumption tax are in general lower compared to our 
baseline simulations. However, a consumption tax combined with OBA still has a welfare improving effect 
for Norway and globally. With heterogeneous goods, the optimal consumption tax is in the range of 60% of 
the OBA rate for Norway (vs. 80% in the baseline simulation), and 100% (vs. 120%) when considering global 
welfare. 
How would a consumption tax introduced in another EU/EEA country than Norway affect both their 
regional and global welfare? In Figure 7 we list the result under various combination of policies in different 
EU countries. In the model, we replace the region Norway with an EU country, and include Norway in the 
EU region. The parameters in the model are calibrated in the same way as described in section 3.2, i.e., 
according to the specific country’s characteristics. In line with section 3.4, we use the permit price in the REF 
scenario to reflect the EU/EEA country’s valuation of global emission. Hence, the valuation of global 
emission for each of the EU/EEA countries is the same as Norway’s in section 3.4. The Armington elasticity 
for the representative agent is set to the same values as in our baseline simulation in section 3.4, and the 
percent values in the figure is the optimal consumption tax rate for the different countries. The figure shows 
the same qualitative result as for Norway, when different EU countries introduce the consumption tax. That 
is, a consumption tax on top of OBA increases regional welfare for all countries. The optimal consumption 
tax is in the range of 80%-200%, with Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania having the highest rate. Because of 
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their small economic size and the countries being net exporter of the carbon free good 𝑥𝑥, their welfare gain is 
substantial compared to BAU. Global welfare increases too in all these cases when a regional consumption 
tax is implemented. The magnitude differs depending on the policy introducing country’s specific 
characteristics, such as the size of the economy and of the sectors. In line with our finding from section 3.4, 
the positive effect on welfare from the consumption tax is mainly due to its effects on emissions and terms of 
trade, and correction of the distortive OBA effects. 
 
Figure 7: Regional welfare effects under different combination of policies in EU/EEA countries. Percentage changes vis-à-vis BAU. 
The numbers indicate optimal consumption tax rate for each country (as a share of the OBA rate). 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
As the world will still rely on unilateral action after the Paris climate agreement, many countries are 
considering or have introduced climate policies such as emission trading systems. Greenhouse gases however 
are global pollutants and unilateral action leads to carbon leakage when there is no global cap on emissions. 
In this paper we have focused on leakage associated with the relocation of emission-intensive and trade-
exposed (EITE) industries. The economics literature have suggested different approaches to mitigate this type 
of carbon leakage, where border carbon adjustment in addition to emission pricing has been regarded as a 
second-best instrument to improve cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy. This instrument may not 
however be politically feasible, so countries and regions have either excluded such industries from their 
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regulations or found other anti-leakage solutions, such as output-based allocation (OBA) to EITE-industries, 
which has been implemented e.g. in the EU ETS.  
However, as OBA acts as an implicit production subsidy to domestic production, this results in too high 
consumption and production worldwide. Hence, an approach where OBA is combined with a consumption 
tax on all use of the EITE goods has been proposed by e.g. Böhringer et al. (2017c). In the current paper we 
have examined whether a single country, being part of a bigger ETS involving many countries where OBA to 
EITE-industries is already in place, should unilaterally implement such a consumption tax.  
We first showed analytically that it is welfare improving for the single country to introduce the consumption 
tax when we account for the benefits of reduced global emissions, unless there are strong unfavorable terms-
of-trade effects. Moreover, the consumption tax has an unambiguous global welfare improving effect. Next, 
we confirmed these results with a stylized numerical model calibrated to real world data, where we considered 
the context of the EU ETS. Individual EU/EEA members were consistently better off in welfare terms if 
implementing such a consumption tax.  
If the tax is set equal to the output-based allocation factors (“benchmarks”), the administrative cost of adding 
such a consumption tax will likely be limited (Neuhoff et al., 2016a; Ismer and Haussner, 2016). Böhringer et 
al. (2017c) shows that the outcome of this combined policy will be equivalent to a certain variant of border 
carbon adjustments. However, a more differentiated variant of carbon tariffs could still be more targeted than 
a consumption tax, especially if the tariff is able to differentiate between firms according to their emission 
intensity (Böhringer et al. 2017b). First of all, it would redirect imports (and consumption) towards the least 
emission-intensive countries or producers, as these are less hit by the tariff. In addition, if the tariffs are firm-
specific they might give these firms incentives to reduce their emission intensity. Still, the question remains 
about the compatibility with WTO rules. Thus, in the meantime combining output-based allocation with a 
consumption tax seems like a powerful and acceptable policy strategy to mitigate carbon leakage, also for 
individual countries involved in a more extensive emission trading system.
24 
 
Appendix A, Derivations 
A1: Region welfare maximization 
 




































































































































































































+ (𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣1)
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�1
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1





























Recall (4), further we differentiate (4) w.r.t. consumption tax, remembering the product rule: 
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1















































































+ (𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣1)
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�1
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1









































































(𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦�1) +
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
(𝑥𝑥1 − ?̅?𝑥1) + (𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣1)
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�1
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1












































(𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦�1) +
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
































Recall the constraint on emission in region 1 and 2, 𝐸𝐸� = 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧2. By differentiating this w.r.t 

































(𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦�1) +
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1






























(𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦�1) +
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1


























(𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦�1) − 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1

























A2: Global Welfare Maximization 
 



























































− (𝜏𝜏 + 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1




− (𝜏𝜏 + 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧2)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧2
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1















+ �𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥�
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1











− (𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡1)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦1
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
− (𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡1)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
− (𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡2)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦2
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
− (𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡2)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧2
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1









Since good 𝑧𝑧 is non-tradable, the production in region 𝑗𝑗 is equal to consumption in the same region. Also 
recall that 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒
𝑦𝑦3 = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧3 = 0 and 𝑡𝑡1 = 𝑡𝑡2 












































































































































































The equation can be simplified to 









𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥� +
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1 �
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 − ?̅?𝑥𝑥𝑥� + �𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥�
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1










































𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑥𝑥� +
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1 �






























































Recall our assumption from (1): 
?̅?𝑥1 + ?̅?𝑥2 + ?̅?𝑥3 = 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑥𝑥3 
𝑦𝑦�1 + 𝑦𝑦�2 + 𝑦𝑦�3 = 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2 + 𝑦𝑦3 
 








































































































































Appendix B: Summary of the numerical CGE model 
 
Indices and sets: 
Set of regions R  NOR, EU, ROW 
Set of goods  g  x, y ,z 
r (alias j)   Index for regions 
 
Variables: 
𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Production of good g in r 
𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔   Production of FE in r 
𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Aggregated consumer demand of good g in r 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Value-added composite for g in r 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔  Value-added composite for FE in r 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Armington aggregate of g in r 
𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Import aggregate of g in r 
𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔  Consumption composite in r 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔  Price of g in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔   Price of Primary fossil FE in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Price of value added for g in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔   Price of value added for FE in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔  Price of labor (wage rate) in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔   Price of capital (rental rate) in r 
𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝑔𝑔   Rent for primary energy resource in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Price of Armington aggregate of g in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Price of aggregate imports of g in r 
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑔𝑔   Price of CO2 emission in r 
𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔   Price of consumption composite in r 
𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Output-Based Allocation on g in r 





𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔   Substitution between value-added and energy g in r 
𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔   Substitution between value-added g in r 
𝜎𝜎𝑄𝑄𝑔𝑔  Substitution between value-added and natural resource in FE in r 
𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔   Substitution between value-added in FE in r 
𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Substitution between import and domestic g in r 
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Substitution between imports from different g in r 
𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔   Substitution between goods to consumption 
 
𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Cost Share of FE in production of g in r 
𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Cost Share of labor in production of g in r 
𝜃𝜃𝑄𝑄𝑔𝑔   Cost Share of natural resource in production of FE in r 
𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔   Cost Share of labor in production of FE in r 
𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Cost Share of domestic goods g in consumption in r 
𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Cost Share of different imports goods g in consumption in r 
 
𝐾𝐾0
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Labor endowment in sector g in region 𝑟𝑟 
𝐾𝐾0,𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔   Labor endowment in FE in region 𝑟𝑟 
𝐾𝐾0
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  Capital endowment in sector g in region 𝑟𝑟 
𝐾𝐾0,𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔   Capital endowment in FE in region 𝑟𝑟 
𝑄𝑄0𝑔𝑔  Resource endowment of primary fossil energy in region 𝑟𝑟 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑔𝑔  CO2 emission allowance in region 𝑟𝑟 




Zero Profit Conditions 
Production of goods except for fossil primary energy:  
𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = �𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸












     ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔       ⊥ 𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 
 












   ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔            ⊥ 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  
 
Production of fossil primary energy: 
𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔 = �𝜃𝜃𝑄𝑄𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝑔𝑔
�1−𝜎𝜎𝑄𝑄





     ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔            ⊥ 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔  
 
Sector specific value-added aggregate for FE: 
𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔 = �𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔
(1−𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿





𝑟𝑟 �    ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔            ⊥ 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔 
 











     ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔            ⊥ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 
 










     ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼














     ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔            ⊥ 𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔 
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𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔         ⊥ 𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
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𝜕𝜕�𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔 + 𝜅𝜅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑔𝑔 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 �
                   ⊥ 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔  
 













CO2 Emission in region: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝜅𝜅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑔𝑔 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔       ⊥ 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑔𝑔  
 
Consumption by consumers 
𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔 𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔 ��𝐾𝐾0
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔
+ 𝐾𝐾0,𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔 � + 𝑝𝑝𝐾𝐾𝑔𝑔 ��𝐾𝐾0
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔




Elasticities: 𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸 = 0.5  𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 = 1 
 
Figure B1: Nesting in production, except for fossil fuel energy 
 
Elasticities: 𝜎𝜎𝑄𝑄 = 0.9  𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 = 1 
 
 
Figure B2: Nesting in production of fossil fuel energy 
 





Appendix C: Mapping of WIOD sectors 
 
Model Sectors WIOD Sectors 
y: emission-intensive and tradable goods Oil, Mining and Quarrying; Chemicals and 
Chemical Products; Basic Metals and Fabricated 
Metal; Other Non-Metallic Mineral; Transport 
Equipment; Textiles and Textile Products; Food, 
Beverages and Tobacco; Pulp, Paper, Paper , 
Printing and Publishing  
z: emission-intensive and non-tradable goods Transport Sector (air, water, rail, road); Electricity 
x: emission-free and tradable goods All remaining goods and services 
Table C1: Mapping of WIOD sectors to model sectors 
Table C1 shows the mapping of the 56 WIOD sectors to three composite sectors in our model. 
 
1 Cf. also the pollution haven literature, e.g. (Taylor 2005). 
2 Leakage mainly occurs through two channels, i.e., i) fossil fuel markets; and ii) markets for EITE goods. This paper 
focuses on leakage in the latter case. The leakage rates for the EITE industries specifically are usually found to be 
somewhat higher than the overall leakage rates, see e.g. Fischer and Fox (2012). The theoretical literature on leakage goes 
back to Markussen (1975), and other important contributions are Hoel (1996) and Copeland (1996). 
3 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/leakage_en  
4 Ismer and Haussner (2016) discuss the correct legal basis under EU law: “inclusion of consumption may be based on 
Article 192.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and thus be adopted without unanimity voting in the Council 
of the EU.” 
5 Neuhoff et al. (2016b) looks at 4047 commodity groups and finds that a consumption tax combined with ETS will 
have some administrative burdens, but could be moderate if designed correctly. Further, they conclude that 
“administrative efforts for 77 to 83% of imports could be avoided while still 85% to 90% of import-related carbon 
liabilities are included”. 
6 To simplify notation, we replace ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖=1  with 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 in the equations. 
7 The correct definition of the Pigouvian tax is the global marginal external costs of emissions. Whether 𝜏𝜏𝑥𝑥reflects this, 
or only domestic costs of global emissions, does not matter for the analytical results.  
8 See Appendix A1. 
9 We have tested the signs of d) and e) in our numerical simulations. The numerical simulation in the context of EU ETS 






in ROW falls, while emission in the non-tradable and emission intensive sector increases. The net emission effect in 
ROW is still negative (as we suggested), and the sum of d) and e) is negative. 
10 See Appendix A2 
11 This could be the case if there is no trade between regions 1-2 and region 3, or if region 3 is much smaller than regions 
1-2, in which case production and consumption changes in regions 1-2 are much bigger than in region 3. 
12 We also simulate the model with capital immobile between sectors, see Section 3.5. 
13 See appendix B for CGE-summary and nesting in different sectors. 
14 The model is implemented as a Mixed Complementarity Problem in GAMS, using the PATH-solver. 
15 CO2-data for Norway is collected from Statistics Norway (SSB). 
16 See appendix C for mapping of WIOD sectors. 
17 In our dataset, sector 𝑥𝑥 accounted for 14-15% of the global CO2 emissions in 2009. 
18 Given the existence of the EU ETS in 2009, we can think of this as an additional emission reduction target of 20 
percent relative to the base-year emission.  
19 Although allocation in the EU ETS is based on the emission intensities of the best performing 10% of the installations 
(for a specific product), total allocation to industrial installations in phase 3 (since 2013) has been on average above 90% 
of total emissions to these industries (according to Refinitiv Carbon Research). For the most exposed industries, the 
share is likely even higher. 
20 Compared to the welfare expression in (5), the cost functions are excluded and replaced with the endowment and 
technological constraints as explained above. 
21 Recall that the leakage rate is measured as emission changes in ROW divided by emission reductions in EU+NOR. 
22 Recall from table 2, that Norway is net exporter of the emission-intensive and trade-exposed good 
23 We assume that 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊= 0 in ROW’s welfare function, as there is no climate policy in this region (in our analysis). 
24 Recall that the emission price falls with introduction of the consumption tax in the base case simulation, also resulting 
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